The Hinge of Fate

What do Ukraine’s lightning battlefield gains mean for global politics? Chris Miller on the shifting calculations in Moscow, Beijing, and the West. Ground Shift What do Ukraine’s lightning battlefield gains mean for global politics? Chris Miller on the shifting calculations in Moscow, Beijing, and the West. [Oles Navrotskyi]( Oles Navrotskyi In a stunning counter-offensive, Ukraine has retaken hundreds of square miles of its territory from Russian military occupation in the past two weeks. Ukrainian armed forces have now regained control of much of the northeastern part of the country, including the city of Kharkiv, while Russian troops rapidly retreat. Ukraine’s military has also made gains in the country’s south. Media coverage of the victories shows residents of liberated cities tearfully welcoming Ukrainian soldiers, while hasty Russian withdrawals have left behind weapons, vehicles, even food and clothing. But these developments are bringing important consequences outside the country’s borders too. Russia’s dramatic and surprising losses will affect the dynamics around Vladimir Putin in Moscow, as well as how key Kremlin allies, such as China, see the conflict—and Putin himself. Political and military leaders in the West could adapt their thinking to Ukraine’s military progress, as well, as they monitor the situation and decide how to back Kyiv. What are the full geopolitics implications of the counter-offensive? Chris Miller is an assistant professor of international history at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and the co-director of the school’s Russia and Eurasia Program. To Miller, it’s now clear within Russia that Putin’s strategies for the war—touting its successes, downplaying its costs, and [using Russian energy supplies]( to pressure the West—are all failing. Putin has put himself in an [untenable position]( Miller says, by constantly framing the war as easy to win, because Putin can’t now admit to the substantial human and material resources Russia needs to push back against the Ukrainian advance. Meanwhile, his most important ally, China, now seems to have made a [very poor decision]( in sticking close to Moscow, with Russia looking increasingly weak as a global power. As Miller sees it, Kyiv’s gains on the ground are changing how Western leaders perceive [possible resolutions]( of the conflict—but while these gains make a Ukrainian victory more likely, the ultimate outcome of the war is still unclear. ——— Michael Bluhm: What do you make of these recent and ongoing battlefield gains? Chris Miller: It’s always difficult to make predictions in a war, but everyone has regularly underestimated Ukraine’s capabilities since the start of this one. Clearly, the Ukrainians have demonstrated the ability to launch a meaningful counter-offensive against the Russians. Clearly, the Russians have demonstrated an inability to properly defend against it—unable to have intelligence about where Ukraine is going to attack and unable to maintain the reserve capacity to reinforce positions facing pressure from the Ukrainians. We don’t know to what extent that’s generalizable across all Russian positions or whether it’s somehow unique to the Kharkiv area. Insofar as it’s generalizable, Russia’s defeats during the past couple of weeks will weaken its ability to stand up to Ukrainian pressure that much more. I don’t think that means Ukraine is about to push the Russians out of the country in the coming weeks. But it does mean that Ukraine has a plausible story it can tell about how, if it keeps getting arms and the support it needs from the West, it can defeat the Russians over the coming months. Bluhm: How do you see these shifts on the ground in Ukraine affecting [Putin’s position in Russia]( [Advertisement]( Advertisement Miller: It’s clearly embarrassing for him. Putin has identified this war with himself since day one. He promised Russians that it would be a straightforward operation—and within Russia, it’s generally still described as a “special military operation,” to emphasize that it’s not going to impose vast costs on the Russian people. But it’s become clear over the past six months that Russia can’t achieve its goals in Ukraine without a drastic mobilization of the Russian populace and economy. And even that might not achieve Moscow’s goals. But the set of half-measures in play now is less likely to work still. Although Russia started the war with much larger armed forces than Ukraine, Russia is facing issues with a lack of personnel—which shows the dilemma Putin’s set up. He’s afraid to organize a general mobilization because he’s promised a cost-free or at least low-cost war—and yet he’s got serious manpower issues because he can’t call up large number of Russians and force them to serve in the army. He’s facing pressure both from the anti-war doves and the pro-war hawks. The doves can’t articulate this view in public, but people are obviously asking in private, What’s the point of this whole war, anyway? The hawks are saying, Let’s mobilize. Let’s call up tens of thousands more troops, let’s throw the economy into a wartime footing, and let’s win. Putin stands uncomfortably in the middle, asserting maximalist goals of defeating Ukraine while being unwilling to devote the resources needed to have a real shot at it. [Oles Navrotskyi]( Oles Navrotskyi More from Chris Miller at The Signal: “There’s a chance that the muddle-through option could work—in other words, that Russia could maintain the current level of resources Putin’s devoted to the war without trying to bring new men into the Russian army and that, maybe, it’ll work. But any sober observer, outside Russia or within, will say it’s unlikely. At the same time, Putin’s also been pursuing a strategy of pressuring the West economically, hoping that the more European energy prices increase, and the more Western consumers feel the pain from expensive oil and gas, the less the West generally will be willing to support Ukraine. But that hasn’t happened either—so far. It’s clear that Russia can drive up energy prices, especially in Europe, but it’s not clear that this will force concessions from European leaders. Most likely, Russia will continue pursuing these two strategies, for at least some time, and hope that they produce different results—which I wouldn’t say is a particularly rational policy-making process.” “China has been hedging since the start of the war—but it was hedging on the assumption that Russia would win or achieve some sort of result that looks close to victory. Now the opposite’s happened. Beijing has been hedging between the West, on the one hand, and a Moscow, on the other, that looks a lot less competent than it did seven months ago—and particularly, a lot less competent in the sphere where Russia has historically punched above its weight: military capability. If Russia’s military isn’t nearly as impressive as we thought, then Moscow looks like a much less relevant player, because realistically, it has very few other levers of power that it can pull. If it is true that Russia is less relevant, then it looks like a strategic error on China’s part to have hedged between a less relevant, less powerful, less impressive Russia and a more influential, more powerful West. I don’t think Chinese President Xi Jinping is going to admit that error, but the better Ukraine does in the war, the less intelligent this Chinese policy of hedging will appear.” “Ukraine’s battlefield gains are unlikely to affect the energy calculus on the European side, because the changes underway in Europe aren’t designed to be relevant over a matter of weeks or months but over years. Regardless of what happens on the battlefield in the next three or six months, Europe will be buying substantially less Russian gas in a couple of years’ time—maybe zero, maybe a small amount, but far less than it’s buying today. The same is true with oil. European oil imports are going to decline regardless of what happens on the battlefield. Europe has made a generational decision to dramatically reduce its reliance on Russian energy. It concluded that its prior decision to integrate with Russia through energy supplies was a mistake. And that conclusion isn’t going to change, whether Ukraine continues its counter-offensive or Russia manages to fight back.” ——— [The Signal]( is a digital publication exploring key questions in democratic life and the human world, sustained entirely by readers like you. To support The Signal and for full access: This email address is unmonitored; please send questions or comments [here](mailto:mail@thesgnl.com) To advertise with The Signal: advertise@thesgnl.com Add us to your [address book](mailto:newsletter@thesgnl.com) Unsubscribe here © 2022 The Signal The Signal | 1717 N St. NW, Washington, DC 20011 [Unsubscribe {EMAIL}]( [Constant Contact Data Notice]( Sent by newsletters@thesgnl.email