With Friends Like These

What does Russia’s war in Ukraine mean for China, its close ally? Victor Shih on Beijing’s bad and worse options. An Inconvenient Invasion What does Russia’s war in Ukraine mean for its ally in China? Victor Shih on Beijing’s bad and worse options. In a photo of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin taken in Beijing, just before the Olympics in February, the two clasp hands and smile to the camera. After the meeting, Xi and Putin declared in a joint statement that their countries’ relationship had “no limits” and “no forbidden zones.” As more than 150,000 Russian troops massed at Russia’s border with Ukraine, the statement also pronounced Beijing’s and Moscow’s shared opposition to the idea of Ukraine joining NATO—or in Xi’s and Putin’s terms, NATO’s “expansion” into Ukraine. The Russian army invaded four days after the Olympics’ closing ceremonies, bringing severe economic sanctions against Russia and global outrage against Moscow—and in turn, intense pressure on Xi. The United States has threatened China with sanctions if it gives any direct military or economic aid to Russia. How is Beijing handling these tensions? Victor Shih is the Ho Miu Lam Chair in China and Pacific Relations at the University of California, San Diego, and the author of Factions and Finance in China: Elite Conflict and Inflation. Shih sees the war as putting China’s leadership in a very difficult position. The country needs trade with the West far more than it does with Russia, so supporting the invasion could undercut Beijing’s economic power. At the same time, Xi has a substantial interest in helping Putin, not wanting to see his strongest partner weakened—or potentially overthrown. Putin knows this and is counting on it to ensure substantial aid from Beijing. As Shih sees it, all of this is leading to a pivotal moment for China, forcing it to alter its behavior in significant ways and even reconsider some of the foundations of its geopolitical strategy. ——— Michael Bluhm: How do you see Beijing responding to the war in Ukraine? Victor Shih: This is a very delicate moment for Beijing. Putin and Chinese leadership—and this goes back to before Xi Jinping took power, to Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin—all believed that the U.S. was a dominant power that sought to undermine, if not overthrow, dictatorial governments—especially post-communist dictatorial governments like China and Russia. Beijing and Moscow found common cause in resisting this. In China, the approach was to build economic strength, watch, and prepare. But this approach came to an end during the Xi era. Part of it was because Beijing saw the United States reorienting in the late Obama years—the United States pivoted toward the Indo-Pacific region and began to talk about the need to compete with China. But Ukraine puts China on the spot: Russia started a hot war consistent with its narrative that a U.S.-led NATO alliance is trying to undermine Russia and the entire Eurasian authoritarian bloc. Bluhm: How much support is China giving Putin? [Advertisement]( Advertisement Shih: I don’t think it’s an either-or choice for China on supporting Putin—it’s a continuum. Beijing can choose to back Russia 100 percent, by sending weapons systems, maybe military advisors, and defense-oriented aid on a massive scale. The other extreme is agreeing with everything the U.S. wants to do, which I also find very unlikely. In between, there are extremely delicate choices. On the one hand, there are decades of this common cause in resisting U.S. dominance. On the other hand, China has $660 billion in trade with the United States, whereas it has less than $150 billion in trade with Russia. Economically, the U.S. and Western Europe together are so much more important for China than Russia is. Of course, this massive trade means that the U.S. and Europe also cannot afford to not trade with China—and China knows that. It provides a cushion to bilateral relationships, because everyone knows that we can’t really stop trade overnight. But if Beijing leans toward providing military aid to Moscow, it will change the trajectory of the trade relationship. The U.S. can’t stop trading with China overnight, but policy makers in the U.S. would start creating incentives for companies no longer to produce components in China. We all love buying cheaply made consumer electronics, but whatever the U.S. does, it will most likely make things more expensive for U.S. consumers. More from Victor Shih at The Signal: “This has the potential to make Russia a vassal state of China, especially if Western Europe manages to reduce or stop its consumption of energy from Russia. During the summer, Western Europe can afford to stop. In the summer months, China may well become the only major buyer of Russian energy, which would make Russia highly dependent on China. At the same time, it’s become very difficult for Russia to import electronics from North America or Europe. China, of course, produces all this stuff.” “The war has created three effects internationally. First, it’s creating unity within the United States; there seems to be bipartisan support for the Ukrainians, except for fringe figures in the Republican Party. Second, it is creating unity within NATO. Third, Russia is getting weaker and becoming a pariah state, which means Putin himself is getting weaker—especially when his supporters are getting sanctioned and their assets are being frozen. For Beijing, the worst possible outcome is a super-united NATO, Putin falling out of power, and Russia having a pro-Western, democratic regime. That would be terrible for an already-paranoid China that lives with the idea: We’re surrounded by enemies—India, Taiwan, Japan—but fortunately, we have these friendly countries on our northern border.” “Putin knows Beijing doesn’t want him to lose power. There’s a famous theorem in economics called the rotten-kid theorem, which is that your kids know you love them endlessly, so they know they can behave in whatever ways they want, because any threat of withdrawn resources or punishment isn’t very credible. This is the relationship between China and Russia right now: Putin knows that Beijing can’t afford to have him out of power, so he can go ahead and continue this bloody, tragic gamble in Ukraine.” ——— Meanwhile [The Americans]( Where is sympathy for Putin in U.S. conservative media coming from? Cathy Young on the unusually complicated feelings about the Russian president running through the American right. [Into the Breach]( Is the West reuniting? Matthias Matthijs on how the war in Ukraine is changing the global security, economic, and political terrain. [This is Kyiv]( What are the ideas and incentives shaping American coverage of the war in Ukraine? Philip Seib on narrative patterns, business models, and the propelling force of “journalistic adrenaline.” ——— Publishing in public beta since 2021, [The Signal]( explores urgent questions in current events around the world. To support The Signal and for full access: ——— This email address is unmonitored; please send questions or comments [here](mailto:mail@thesgnl.com) To advertise with The Signal: advertise@thesgnl.com Add us to your [address book](mailto:newsletters@thesgnl.email) © 2022 The Signal The Signal | 717 N St. NW, Ste. 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