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War Is Peace, Ignorance Is Strength

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How is propaganda from Russia shaping the global context of the war in Ukraine? Mike Smeltzer on the

How is propaganda from Russia shaping the global context of the war in Ukraine? Mike Smeltzer on the Kremlin’s program for manipulating the media at home and abroad. The Moscow Line How is propaganda from Russia shaping the global context of the war in Ukraine? Mike Smeltzer on the Kremlin’s program for manipulating the media at home and abroad. Western leaders are fighting an information war, as Russia continues to press its invasion of Ukraine. The European Union took the unprecedented step of banning the state media outlets Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik. According to the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, these outlets “will no longer be able to spread their lies to justify Putin’s war and to sow division in our union.” Neither is the EU alone in trying to disrupt the Kremlin’s media agenda. YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram are blocking them in Europe. RT America announced it was “ceasing production” due to “unforeseen business interruption events” after it was dropped by DirecTV and Roku. Meanwhile, the Russian government is limiting—and in some cases, ending—Russians’ access to social media. The Kremlin is also criminalizing and restricting access to independent journalism, forcing some news organizations to close. What effects are all of these initiatives and counter-initiatives having on the conflict in Ukraine? Mike Smeltzer is a senior research analyst for Europe and Eurasia at Freedom House. To Smeltzer, the global battle of narratives over Ukraine is moving in an uncertain direction—just like the military conflict itself. These parallel struggles, he says, will continue to intersect with and influence each other: Much of the world is currently rejecting Russian attempts to frame the invasion, but the Kremlin is constantly looking for new tactics, and its propaganda still has the potential to undermine support for the Ukrainians. Another complicating factor, as Smeltzer sees it, is that banning Russian propaganda can have unintended consequences, emboldening autocrats and making liberal democrats look hypocritical in promoting the value of freedom. ——— Graham Vyse: How do you see Russia’s state-controlled media presenting the war? Mike Smeltzer: Well, of course the Kremlin isn’t calling it a war; they’re calling it a “special military operation,” with the absurd goals of stopping a “genocide” that isn’t happening and protecting these self-proclaimed states of Donetsk and Luhansk, which were unilaterally recognized by the Russian government. In reality, as we know, it’s an unprovoked invasion of Ukraine that now represents the lengths Putin will go to, to retain domestic power and assert regional control. It’s important to remember, though, that even in the West, Ukraine’s agency tends to get lost. The framing often comes down to the West versus Russia, ignoring the fact that Ukraine should be able to make its own decisions. Russian propaganda is basically trying to deny Ukraine its independent culture, history, and statehood. Vyse: How coordinated is this propaganda? [Advertisement]( Advertisement Smeltzer: It comes from the highest echelons of the Kremlin. It seems like an eternity, but it was only weeks ago that Putin gave this speech to his country pushing false narratives about the illegitimacy of the Ukrainian state—that it needed to be “denazified” and “decommunized,” that NATO is threatening Russia’s security. It presented a whole set of grievances, which ground Putin’s justification for war. A lot of the Russian propaganda were seeing now was already being spread in state-controlled media before the start of the war At the same time, independent media has been under serious attack by the Kremlin. The Russian government has abused its “foreign agent” laws enormously over the last few years, forcing independent outlets to register as foreign agents and to put warnings on their content, which inhibits their ability to gain an audience and raise funds. The law expanded to include individual journalists, who have to register as foreign agents. All of this has escalated during this war. Using the words “war” or “invasion” to describe what’s happening is now a crime in Russia, for which you can be sentenced to 15 years in prison. As a result, some news outlets have decided to stop covering the war directly. The Kremlin has blocked or shut down other outlets. International outlets like The New York Times, BBC, and CNN have suspended work in Russia as a result of growing restrictions on media. The result is a media environment dominated by state-owned or state-controlled outlets parroting Kremlin talking points. If you’re watching Russian television, you don’t see the indiscriminate bombing of Kyiv or images of dead or fleeing Ukrainians. When I wake up in the morning, I’ll tune into Russia-24, a state-owned news channel. It’s obviously not the most pleasant way to start the day, but it gives me a sense of the Kremlin’s narrative. Before you and I spoke today, Russia-24 was pushing a story about NATO and Ukraine planning to take back the Donbas, showing images of official-looking documents detailing elaborate plans to attack Donetsk and Luhansk. There’s no evidence of any of it. It’s just a narrative. More from Mike Smeltzer at The Signal: “Russians aren’t simply watching one channel that tells them everything. They have multiple channels to choose from. But while the American media ecosystem might have lots of different partisan channels with different biases, Russian channels all push the same narrative—that this is a righteous war to help liberate the people of Donetsk and Luhansk, and to “denazify” Ukraine. You see an age gap in media consumption, with older people tending to watch television controlled directly by the state, while younger people tend to use the internet, but the Kremlin has moved to control the internet too.” “Moscow is using social media and its foreign-media influence, via RT and Sputnik, to put out its narrative. There’s some uncertainty about what impact all of this has. We’ve seen some effective pushback so far, but I’d emphasize that it’s still early in this war. There’s time for the Kremlin to innovate, and we’re already seeing it. While there’s been great work by open-source fact checkers, like Bellingcat, to debunk Russian propaganda—and Ukrainians on the ground, risking their lives to videotape or post on TikTok about the violent realities of the war—the Kremlin is still trying to find ways to create doubt in people’s minds about who’s to blame for the situation. I see it in my own Facebook feed—Americans holding things against Biden, NATO, or the West: Sure, Putin isn’t a good guy, but Russia isn’t entirely to blame, either.” “I’m wary of blanket Western bans on these Russian state propaganda outlets. You need to make exceptions if they’re calling for violence or violating licensing agreements, but it’s so important to go about this in a way that shows respect for free speech; it’s so important not to give the Kremlin or other autocrats an excuse to punish independent media outlets in their own countries. We have to be able to support civil and political rights while still doing what’s necessary to keep people safe—and that’s such a fine balance. There are things that can be done to limit the impact of RT or Sputnik on YouTube, for instance—demonetizing their content or limiting its amplification by adjusting algorithms, recommendation systems, and advertising policies in ways that are transparent and evenly applied.” ——— ——— Publishing in public beta since 2021, [The Signal]( explores urgent questions in current events around the world. To support The Signal and for full access: This email address is unmonitored; please send questions or comments [here](mailto:mail@thesgnl.com) To advertise with The Signal: advertise@thesgnl.com Add us to your [address book](mailto:newsletters@thesgnl.email) © 2022 The Signal The Signal | 717 N St. NW, Ste. One, Washington, DC 20011 [Unsubscribe {EMAIL}]( [Constant Contact Data Notice]( Sent by newsletters@thesgnl.email

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