The Moscow Gambit

What is Vladimir Putin thinking? Anatol Lieven on the brutal calculations behind Russia’s attack on Ukraine. War in Europe What is Moscow thinking? Anatol Lieven on the brutal calculations behind Russia’s attack on Ukraine. Even as Russian armed forces destroy much of Ukraine’s military capability and ground troops push toward the country’s major cities—with at least dozens of civilians already dead and hundreds more wounded—Vladimir Putin’s ultimate intentions remain unclear. Western officials and regional experts are urgently trying to unravel what Moscow’s goals are and how far into Ukraine he plans to go. Amid all this uncertainty, the European Union, the U.S., and numerous other countries have moved to punish Moscow by crippling Russia’s economy through sanctions, banning foreign travel, and freezing assets belonging to Putin’s cronies and other oligarchs. How bad could all of this get? Anatol Lieven, the senior research fellow on Russia and Europe at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, is the author of [Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry]( and two other books on Russia. According to Lieven, the costs of the Russian invasion could be terrible—not just to Ukraine but to Russia as well: The Russian economy could be devastated by Western sanctions, leaving the country with few allies abroad—and could ultimately wind up dependent on China. In Lieven’s view, Putin sees the potential by invading Ukraine to finally restore the prestige of the Russian military and definitively end NATO’s eastward expansion. Putin and the Russian leadership meanwhile feel humiliated, Lieven says, by the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War, wanting to see Russia recognized as equals with European powers in managing European security issues. But now that Putin has decided on a massive, deadly assault, the West can avoid a direct military response, but it has no choice other than to create major consequences. ——— Michael Bluhm: We know Putin is now risking devastation in Ukraine. What’s he risking for Russia? Anatol Lieven: First, great economic damage. Sanctions since 2014 have knocked at least 1 percent off Russian economic growth. The sanctions the West is proposing will do much more damage. Russia has built up resilience against that, but it will undoubtedly still have a grave effect. This might not directly turn into unpopularity for the regime at home. The regime is already unpopular on account of corruption, general discontent, and anger with misgovernment. If people’s economic situation gets worse, then that will fuel wider discontent. That’s a threat. If it leads Europe to try to move beyond [Russian gas]( will be very difficult in the short term, but it can manage that over some years—then Russia’s only remaining major market will be China. This will put Russia completely in China’s pocket, with implications for the price of gas, because it’ll then be a buyer’s market for China. In the longer term, Russia will effectively become a raw-material supplier to China, which is something that the Russian elites dread—and wouldn’t be risking if they felt that the West had left them much choice in the matter. Bluhm: How bad could this get for Ukraine itself? [Advertisement]( Advertisement Lieven: The critical question is how far Russia goes. If Russia tries to take all the Russian-speaking areas—basically half of Ukraine—then there are so many unknowns. How hard will the Ukrainians fight? If they fight it out in cities, then you will have massive destruction. Civilian casualties will make ludicrous Russia’s claims to be going to defend Russian speakers in Ukraine, because so many of the civilian dead will be ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. This might go down very badly with Russian public opinion. The next question is, How does Russia administer these places after taking them? That’s why I don’t think it likely—and Putin’s speech on February 21 doesn’t actually suggest—that Russia will march into Kyiv and try to replace the Ukrainian government. Who would they find to run Ukraine? Even in the Russian-speaking areas—and especially if the Russian invasion involves heavy civilian casualties—they could find themselves ruling over a deeply angry and resentful population. They didn’t face that in the Donbas or Crimea, where the bulk of the population did seem to favor separation from Ukraine. More from Anatol Lieven at The Signal: “The biggest question is if Russia says, We’ve never used gas as a weapon against you. We’re completely totally prepared to go on selling you gas. Do you want it? Would the Germans and others be prepared to take the energy hit of doing without Russian gas? If Russia does invade much larger swaths of Ukraine, then Nord Stream 2 is dead. As far as the wider issue of Russian gas, you’ll see greatly intensified European attempts at energy independence from Moscow.” “We don’t know how far China will go in supporting the Russian economy. Russia is a big place for China to support, but there are great Chinese advantages to be gained in making Russia completely dependent on China. If Moscow has decided to conquer half of Ukraine, then it’s decided it can bear the economic suffering resulting from that. It wouldn’t do so had it not calculated the consequences.” “Putin thinks in 19th-century terms. Part of the benefit would be to recreate Russia’s 19th-century prestige. Large parts of Putin’s speech suggested that, as he gets older and begins to look to his historic legacy, he may want to go down in history as the man who recovered 100,000 square miles and 20 million people for Russia. He’s not just a corrupt, post-Soviet semi-dictator. He’s the heir of General Alexander Suvorov and Catherine the Great. That’s dangerous, because at that point, Putin is set on conquest and retention.” ——— ——— [The Signal]( is a digital publication exploring vital questions in democratic life and the human world, sustained entirely by readers like you. To support The Signal and for full access: This email address is unmonitored; please send questions or comments [here](mailto:mail@thesgnl.com) To advertise with The Signal: advertise@thesgnl.com Add us to your [address book](mailto:newsletters@thesgnl.email) © 2022 The Signal The Signal | 717 N St. NW, Ste. One, Washington, DC 20011 [Unsubscribe {EMAIL}]( [Constant Contact Data Notice]( Sent by newsletters@thesgnl.email