Bad Guys Losing

Why are elected authoritarians losing public support? Steven Levitsky on how voter frustration is turning against them. Same as the Old Boss Why are elected authoritarians losing public support? Steven Levitsky on how voter frustration is turning against them. A wave of authoritarian-populist political leaders—including Brazil’s [Jair Bolsonaro]( Hungary’s Viktor Orban, Turkey’s [Recep Tayyip Erdogan]( and America’s [Donald Trump]( eroded democratic institutions in countries around the world over the last decade. Elected to fight for the little people against corrupt elites, these authoritarian populists have attacked or closed independent news media, manipulated legal systems to persecute opponents, and rewritten laws in order to secure their electoral advantages and power. The challenge to democracy they represent has provoked fears, and a great deal of media debate, about whether democracies would break down—or whether illiberal rulers now have some sort of [global upper hand](. But many of the world’s elected autocrats now seem to be losing public support—even in danger of losing their next elections. Bolsonaro’s approval rating in Brazil has plummeted to [19 percent]( and he badly [trails]( former President Lula da Silva in polls ahead of next year’s vote. Orban’s party, Fidesz, stands about [four points]( behind a newly united opposition in voter surveys before Hungary’s 2022 general election. Erdogan oversees a [collapsing economy]( in Turkey, with rising unemployment and the lira having lost 75 percent of its value since last year. Why are the authoritarian populists becoming so vulnerable? Steven Levitsky is a professor of government at Harvard University and co-author of the 2018 book [How Democracies Die](. According to Levitsky, these autocrats were never really as mighty as they seemed. Many of them have performed poorly in office, especially in response to Covid-19. And over time, he says, public opinion inevitably shifts away from even the most popular among them, regardless of what they deliver. Still, in Levitsky’s view, citizens’ underlying anger and frustration with establishment elites is undiminished—so the parade of ambitious politicians trying to exploit popular resentments with populist appeals isn’t likely to end anytime soon. ——— Michael Bluhm: Some of the best-known and most powerful authoritarian populists are looking weak right now, but popular anger at elites seems as strong as ever. What’s going on? Steven Levitsky: There are a bunch of things going on. First, you’re right that the level of anger at establishments and elites continues to be very high in many parts of the world. What’s new is how easy it is to get elected. In the old days, establishments—meaning establishment media, political parties that nominated candidates, and traditional interest groups such as big labor and big business—had a lot of control over politicians’ careers through the mid-20th century. Back before social media, if you weren’t on good terms with major interest groups or major traditional media, you couldn’t get your name out. Before the advent of party primaries in the U.S., if you weren’t on good terms with party bosses, you couldn’t get anywhere. In the 21st century, with the rise of social media, and with the declining influence of establishments across the board, there’s a supply-side change, as well as the demand-side change. It’s not just that voters are angry everywhere. It’s that it’s much easier to be a Trump, a Bolsonaro, or a Duterte than it was 50 or 60 years ago, so the election of illiberal or authoritarian-leaning populists is likely to continue. The perception that these guys are failing has to do with collective expectations. There was this widespread sense, with the election of people like Trump, Bolsonaro, Erdogan, and Duterte, who weren’t committed to democratic institutions, that there’s a global wave of “autocratization”—that regimes around the world are becoming authoritarian, and everyone’s becoming like Russia and China. That was never true. In some cases—like in the United States, Brazil, and probably Chile, if Jose Antonio Kast is elected—there are robust democratic institutions that stand a good shot at constraining these guys. Trump was as authoritarian as we imagined and feared—and he may still [kill American democracy]( institutions and the opposition were strong enough to push him out of office in 2020. The same may happen to Bolsonaro. In some cases, authoritarians get elected but institutions manage to muddle through. In some cases, authoritarians are really inept at governing, and that was the case with Trump and Bolsonaro. It’s not true everywhere, but Trump and Bolsonaro are especially inept. Above all, though, most electoral authoritarian regimes continue to be electoral. They’re competitive authoritarian regimes, which means that even in the worst instances—like in Ecuador or Hungary, where the playing field gets tilted against the opposition—they don’t represent outright dictatorship. They’re regimes where public opinion matters and where elections matter, even if the elections are no longer entirely fair. More from Steven Levitsky at The Signal: “Not all populists performed badly on Covid-19, but a lot of them did. The pattern seems connected to their relationship with experts and elites. Populists are almost invariably anti-elite and anti-establishment. They’re almost invariably in hostile opposition to experts, intellectuals, and even scientists. That’s true of right-wing populists like Bolsonaro and Trump, and it’s true of left-wing populists like Mexico’s President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador—AMLO. If you don’t like taking the advice of those pointy-headed experts, you might not respond so well to the pandemic.” “Rarely do these guys go much more than a decade without beginning to bleed public support. I’ve never seen an incumbent politician in a minimally free society keep high approval ratings for much longer than that.” “I’d expect individual populists to come and go. Because they’re often amateurish and not very well-organized, a lot of them tend to be ephemeral figures in politics. But the phenomenon of anger and frustration with the political system, with political entrepreneurs tapping into that anger and frustration—political entrepreneurs on the left, or on the right, or with ambiguous politics—that’s very likely to continue. I don’t see any significant demand-side changes there.” ——— ——— Happy Holidays [The Signal]( is a digital publication exploring key questions in democratic life and the human world, sustained entirely by readers like you. During the month of December, when you support The Signal with a new annual subscription, you’ll get full access to all articles—along with a second subscription, free of charge, to send to anyone you’d like. Simply select a Yearly subscription via the link below and follow the steps; at your convenience, send the name and email address for the recipient of your gift subscription to [mail@thesgnl.com](mailto:mail@thesgnl.com?utm_campaign=The%20Signal&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Revue%20newsletter); and they’ll get The Signal, with full access for a year, starting on January 4, 2022. Want to download a digital card to send along with news of your gift? [Here you go.]( © 2021 The Signal The Signal | 717 N St. NW, Ste. 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