Hypersonic Missiles & You

Why would China be developing hypersonic-missile technology? Stacie Pettyjohn on the problem of nuclear deterrence in a multipolar world. “You could have an aircraft shot down while flying through someone’s air-defense identification zone or a collision in the South China Sea that escalates. It could move beyond even a large conventional conflict to a nuclear one.” Weapon of Choice Why would China be developing hypersonic-missile technology? Stacie Pettyjohn on the problem of nuclear deterrence in a multipolar world. The Chinese tested a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile this summer, according to recent reporting in the [Financial Times]( and it’s made U.S. officials anxious. Though Beijing [says]( it was just doing a routine test of spacecraft technology, and though there’s still some uncertainty about what actually took place, U.S. President Joe Biden [acknowledges]( that he’s concerned about the prospect of China having hypersonic weapons. U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham [reportedly is warning]( of a potential nuclear arms race. Why would China have tested this technology, and what are the implications for the U.S. and the rest of the world? Stacie Pettyjohn is a senior fellow and the director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security. According to Pettyjohn, China may be responding to a buildup of U.S. defense capabilities, fearful about the Americans’ ability to destroy Chinese weapons. But, she says, the reported missile testing isn’t particularly surprising—or alarming as an indicator of China’s ability to attack and damage the U.S. Pettyjohn assumes that some of the reaction from American leaders is sensible politics—a way of raising awareness in their country about Beijing’s ambitions and potential threats to U.S. interests—but she cautions that overreaction can be dangerous. If the U.S. government feels compelled to expand its missile defenses, that may fuel China’s worries, triggering a costly and perilous escalation. In Pettyjohn’s view, the United States should continue to develop its own hypersonic weapons, not as a means of matching China’s every move but as such weapons are specifically needed for American military operations, including to advance nuclear deterrence and global stability. ——— Graham Vyse: What this weapon that China reportedly tested, exactly? Stacie Pettyjohn: Part of the reason it’s complicated to understand what the Chinese tested is they tested two things together. Each is a bit exotic, though neither is completely new technologically. The first is an orbital bombardment system, which the Soviets developed during the Cold War in response to the U.S. fielding a ballistic-missile defense system. You have a rocket that shoots a missile up into space, where it falls into orbit, follows a shorter route toward its target, then breaks to move out of orbit, falls back down to the earth, and explodes. The Soviets did this to evade U.S. missile defenses, partly because orbital bombardment systems are harder to detect. They don’t have trajectories that are as easy to project as normal intercontinental ballistic missiles’ are. An intercontinental ballistic missile has to go up and down, and all of the missiles the Soviets had aimed at the U.S.—and vice versa—during the Cold War would traverse the North Pole. If you shoot a rocket and it falls into low-Earth orbit, it can take a longer path, going around the South Pole, which means it can avoid some of the missile defenses the U.S. has and be more likely to reach its target. The second thing the Chinese tested here—and what made it all even more exotic and surprising to some people—was a hypersonic glide vehicle on top. Hypersonic glide vehicles have gotten a lot of attention in the U.S., and the Russians are developing them along with the Chinese. All ballistic missiles fly at hypersonic speeds, but what makes the glide vehicles interesting is that they slow down to maneuver. That increases their survivability and allows them to try to approach their target in a way that would evade different defense systems. More from Stacie Pettyjohn at The Signal: “Right now, you’re seeing these emerging technologies—and hypersonic technology is one of them—that are getting a lot of attention and, in my view, somewhat overblown hype. Ballistic missiles move at hypersonic speeds. The U.S. already has hypersonic missiles. We have lots of them, as do the Chinese and the Russians. What’s different about emerging hypersonic technologies is their maneuverability and their ability to penetrate air defenses. The U.S. has been trying to develop hypersonic technology—with a bit of a sense that China has it, Russia already deployed it, and America should have it too—without necessarily any clear sense of what operational use it would have. It’s just kind of the newest, flashiest toy.” “There will likely be an overreaction in the U.S., and that reaction might be very counterproductive for strategic stability and the likelihood of nuclear-weapons use. If we respond by expanding our missile defenses—putting new sites in other places so they can better intercept an orbital bombardment system or hypersonic glide vehicle—that’s going to continue to fuel China’s concerns about U.S. defenses. … In some ways, if we ended up in a real arms race—where China were building more missiles and the U.S. were to keep building more missiles and missile defenses—it would be disproportionately costly for us. China can much more cheaply build a hypersonic weapon or an orbital bombardment system or an intercontinental ballistic missile than we can build missile defenses. So the United States is on the losing end of the cost-exchange ratio there, and it’s destabilizing.” “The U.S. Department of Defense needs to begin thinking seriously about how to strengthen nuclear deterrence—to avoid nuclear war, escalation, or inadvertent use—and conventional deterrence, and how it handles both of those together. It also needs to begin thinking seriously about now not to overreact, because then we’re going to end up on the losing end by spending more than we can afford on systems that fuel instability.” ——— Meanwhile: How could banning surveillance advertising stop Facebook from manipulating people with bogus content? Amid expanding scandals, Facebook is having to confront increasing scrutiny from Congress and regulators, who’re considering new rules to govern its business. Two former employees have now released extensive internal documentation showing how the corporation intentionally promotes provocative, polarizing content to keep users on the site. I spoke with Sandeep Vaheesan of Open Markets Institute in Washington earlier in October about [whether and how Facebook could be fixed](. Vaheesan discussed possible reforms, such as regulating Facebook as a utility, or spinning off Instagram and WhatsApp, but focused mainly on the idea of banning surveillance advertising, the basis of the company’s business model. Surveillance advertising allows Facebook—and Google, and other large platforms—to collect every piece of data about their users, so they can sell advertisers the precise audiences they want to reach. But how would prohibiting surveillance advertising stop Facebook from elevating sensational content or disinformation to keep users on the site? I asked him. –Michael Bluhm Vaheesan: That’s a good question. Bans on surveillance advertising are one piece of the solution, but not the only one. I didn’t mean to suggest that addressing the business model is a substitute for undoing mergers or otherwise breaking up these companies. It is true that, so long as these companies rely on advertising, they will have an interest in drawing people in, including sometimes through the dissemination of sensationalist content. But if they couldn’t engage in surveillance advertising, they’d become much more like a TV station or a newspaper, both of which rely on advertising for at least some of their revenue. But you don’t necessarily see the same level of sensationalism or incendiary content on ABC or ESPN that you do on Facebook or YouTube. They wouldn’t be able to segment users along hundreds—if not thousands—of dimensions. They wouldn’t be able to channel anti-vax propaganda or right-wing disinformation to a precise audience in the way they do now. Instead, they’d have to rely on contextual advertising. For example, a page belonging to the Trump Organization would probably feature much of the same advertising you see today. But you wouldn’t necessarily see the same broad dissemination that you do today. contextual advertising would force them to rethink the types of ads they carry and to limit such ads to “affinity” groups. Affinity pages wouldn’t necessarily be reaching the same number of people that false information does today. I know that’s probably an unsatisfactory answer, but I do think forcing Facebook to abandon surveillance advertising would diminish the proliferation of false information. You wouldn’t solve the whole problem, but at this point, harm reduction is important too. For more from Sandeep Vaheesan on Facebook’s problems … ——— Free Article This Week [Not Themselves]( What’s the trauma of forced displacement doing to the world’s millions of refugees? Essam Daod on the scale and challenge of a global mental-health crisis. For Subscribers [‘They’re Not Sending You’]( Why is a fear that domestic political enemies are using foreigners to “replace” native-born citizens gaining ground in right-wing politics? Oren Segal on how a fringe idea has gone mainstream. [Great Expectations]( Why are Joe Biden’s approval ratings dropping in U.S. opinion polls? David A. Hopkins on presidential popularity in a polarized age. [Old Hatred, New World]( Where does American anti-Semitism come from these days? Eitan Hersh on how an enduring bigotry is influencing U.S. politics on the right and the left. ——— [The Signal]( is a new digital publication exploring urgent questions in democratic life and the human world—sustained entirely by readers like you. To support The Signal and for full access: ——— © 2021 The Signal The Signal | 717 N St. NW, Ste. 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