War Will Keep Us Together

How has the war in Ukraine affected the alliance between Russia and China? Sergey Radchenko on great-power politics, Moscow’s growing energy exports, and Beijing’s new sway. Brought to you by [The Oslo Freedom Forum]( - Recently from The Signal: Martin Raymond on what it means that tens of trillions of dollars are now [moving from the Baby Boomers to the Millennials and Generation Z](. - Today: How has the war in Ukraine affected the alliance between Russia and China? Sergey Radchenko on great-power politics, Moscow’s growing energy exports, and Beijing’s new sway. - Also: Alice Han on popular discontent in Iran with the regime and its leaders … Trust, but Verify Ivy Dale Praising his country’s relationship with the Kremlin, Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, said in March that the two countries had “forged a new paradigm of major-country relations” that “differs entirely from the obsolete Cold War approach.” On April 8, Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party’s chairman, hosted Sergey Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, in Beijing to lay the groundwork for Xi to meet Vladimir Putin later this spring—it would be the 39th time the pair meet as heads of state. Meanwhile, trade between the two countries hit a record US$240 billion in 2023, up from $146 billion just two years earlier. Still, Russia’s war in Ukraine has tested the “new paradigm.” In February 2022, shortly before the invasion, Xi and Putin declared that their countries’ partnership had “no limits.” But Moscow didn’t consult Beijing before invading, and Beijing hasn’t used the rhetoric since. After the attack, the West imposed [unprecedented economic sanctions]( on Moscow and gradually cut off nearly all Russian exports of oil and natural gas to Europe and North America—forcing the Russian Federation’s economy to rely more and more on the People’s Republic. What’s the war done to this critical partnership? Sergey Radchenko is the Wilson E. Schmidt Distinguished Professor at the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and the author of several books on China-Russia relations. As Radchenko sees it, the course of the war has meant increasing gains for China, both economic and strategic. It’s saved billions buying discounted oil from Russia—while finding a high-demand market there for its cars, phones, semiconductor chips, and machine tools. Russia’s growing economic dependence on China has transformed the Russian Federation into a client state of the People’s Republic, enhancing its status as a great power. As the war continues indefinitely, Beijing holds more and more leverage over Moscow—though short of the leverage to dictate the Kremlin’s conduct of the military campaign in Ukraine. At the same time, Radchenko says, China has remained officially neutral in the Ukraine war and even put forward a peace plan. That plan is unrealistic, but it allows Xi to relentlessly criticize the U.S. and its allies as [fueling conflicts in Europe and the Middle East](. And yet the battlefield stalemate in Ukraine is China’s preferred scenario today. It doesn’t want Russia to lose ground but fears any escalation in fighting—above all, that one side or the other might resort to nuclear weapons. [Read on]( Advertisement From Sergey Radchenko at The Signal: “Russia knows it’s reliant on China—and it understands why: Fundamentally, the reliance is economic. And the reason for this economic reliance is that Russia’s torched its bridges with the West, cutting itself off from Western markets. So it had no choice but to turn to the East. The Russians have tried to compensate for their loss of access to Western markets by importing dual-use technologies from China—items that can be used to produce civilian or military goods. That’s been a blessing for them.” “Trade between Russia and China has increased dramatically. Last year, it was about US$240 billion, which is enormous. If you look at the structure of that trade, it’s all largely from Russia redirecting its exports of oil and gas to China—and then importing technologies and machine tools from it. As a result, about 25 percent of Russia’s external trade is now with China. And that’s a big percentage.” “The Chinese leadership isn’t particularly happy about the invasion. But that doesn’t mean they want Russia to lose. They don’t, because Russia losing would be bad for them; it would mean that the Western-led order had triumphed—and that China might be next.” [Members can access the full conversation here]( FROM THE FILES Build Your Dreams Why Kei On April 15, Tesla informed employees that it would be firing 10 percent of its workforce, or some 14,000 people. The cuts have come in the same month the carmaker reported an 8.5-percent decline in sales in the first quarter of 2024 from the same period last year—the company’s first drop in quarterly sales since the beginning of the pandemic, in 2020. In February, Alice Han [explored how the Chinese auto manufacturer BYD had managed to surpass Tesla as the world’s best-selling electric-vehicle brand in the last three months of 2023](. In Han’s view, BYD has a number of advantages over Tesla: generous government subsidies; cheaper labor and battery costs; and an enormous Chinese market, often favoring domestic products. And yet, Han says, the company’s future—along with the EV market’s globally—is uncertain, on account of a wave of protectionist measures around the world, as well as rising competition from legacy automakers. To read full articles, access our complete archive, and support a new genre of in current affairs: [Join The Signal]( Coming soon: Matthias Matthijs on why farmers across Europe are protesting en masse … Care for The Signal? Forward on to a friend. Sent your way? Sign up [here](. This email address is unmonitored. Please send questions or comments [here](mailto:concierge@thesgnl.com). 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