This Week: All Eyes on Russia

FP's team of reporters and experts answer your pressing questions about the Ukraine crisis [Read this email in your browser]( Welcome to This Week. Our editors have put together a special page featuring our best [recent coverage]( on U.S.-Russia relations, Ukraine, and the impact a potential conflict would have on Europe and the world. You can read our latest stories on how Moscow, Washington, Kyiv, and Brussels are preparing for the possibility of war. Don’t miss FP’s latest coverage: “[What a ‘Minor’ Russian Incursion Into Ukraine May Look Like](,” “[Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis](,” and “[The West’s Weapons Won’t Make Any Difference to Ukraine](.” Next, Foreign Policy’s podcast [FP Playlist]( presents a conversation between Foreign Policy’s editor in chief and two Russia experts on what Russian President Vladimir Putin hopes to gain from his Ukraine gambit. Guests include Michael McFaul, who served as the U.S. ambassador to Russia from 2012 to 2014, and FP’s national security reporter [Amy Mackinnon](. Finally, FP is monitoring the ongoing situation in Ukraine, and will continue to provide essential context and perspectives on the crisis as it develops. We've devoted space on our website [here]( for subscribers to submit questions to our team of reporters and experts. You can read some of our top comments of the week below. Thank you for reading. --------------------------------------------------------------- New from FP Will Russia Attack Ukraine? FP’s editors have put together a [special page]( featuring our best recent coverage on U.S.-Russia relations, Ukraine, and the impact a potential conflict would have on Europe and the world. You can find all of our coverage on important topics—such as Russia’s motives, Washington’s moves, and regional impacts—all in one place. [Read More]( foreignpolicy.com/live/?call=is-there-a-biden-doctrine?utm_source=PostUp&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=this-week [Foreign Policy Playlist]( In the [latest episode]( of Foreign Policy Playlist, we present a conversation between Foreign Policy’s editor in chief and two Russia experts on what Russian President Vladimir Putin hopes to gain from his Ukraine gambit. Guests include Michael McFaul, who served as the U.S. ambassador to Russia from 2012 to 2014, and FP’s national security reporter Amy Mackinnon. [Listen Here]( Your Questions, Answered Thank you to all of the readers who [submitted questions]( to our team of reporters and experts on the Ukraine crisis. Below is a sampling of questions—and answers—from this week. ZGDD: Now that Belarus and Ukraine are at the heart and centre of seemingly escalating tensions, what are the chances that Georgia will also be affected, and what could that look like? Putin has mentioned the three countries in one breath for many years now. Especially if a military attack on Ukraine is avoided or unsuccessful, would it be likely that Georgia will face military attacks from the Russian Federation? From a tactical perspective, Georgia seems an easier feat for Putin than conquering Ukraine. … What are your thoughts? FP reporter Amy Mackinnon: That’s a really good question that you pose. The Georgians will be watching this very closely, given their own history with Russia. Moscow’s proposals to halt NATO expansion eastward would directly affect Georgia if they were taken up (which seems very unlikely, however). There hasn’t been much to suggest that Russia has immediate plans to escalate things with Georgia militarily. They seem to see Ukraine’s ambitions to move closer to Europe and NATO as much more of an existential threat. That may be because Ukraine is just that much bigger, has a much longer border with Russia—which could, in the eyes of Russian officials, leave it more exposed to an attack if Ukraine did join NATO. Georgia’s border with Russia is smaller and also very mountainous. Ukraine also shares more direct borders with NATO states. Ukrainian and Russian history is also closely interlinked, and I think that plays into it as well. It could also be that Georgia began pivoting West much sooner than Ukraine did, when Russia was less able to stop it. --------------------------------------------------------------- BrentK: One seemingly simple solution to the crisis, and one that can be made sitting in front of a computer screen, is the freezing/seizing of Russian oligarch accounts scattered around the world. This is Russian state money looted from the country by Putin and distributed amongst his henchmen safely outside of Russia and kept in foreign currencies for safety and security reasons. There already exists a working list of 50 or so infamous oligarchs scattered around the globe. They could be easily targeted, one by one, and their (read: Putin’s) assets incrementally seized. Of course, this would necessitate the acknowledgement of offshore tax havens, money laundering networks, and all the dark activity involved therein. But given the simplicity and risk-free nature (no military deployment, no Nord Stream involvement, no energy power plays, no SWIFT threats) of this solution, how is this not being seriously discussed? Can we expect any serious consideration of such action, or are all main actors irredeemably corrupt? FP editor Amelia Lester: This issue is touched on in our podcast [Ones and Tooze](, with FP columnist Adam Tooze, this week. And the specific idea about sanctioning oligarchs is considered in this [December 2021 explainer]( by FP’s Amy Mackinnon. That article concludes that cutting off banks is perhaps the most effective option—even more so than cutting Russia off from SWIFT, the so-called “nuclear” option. Interestingly, the sanctions announced by U.S. President Joe Biden recently do target individuals—but Ukrainians rather than Russians. The four individuals in question are [accused]( of being involved in “Russian government-directed efforts to destabilize and establish control over the Ukrainian government” and include two parliamentarians. I’d also recommend our [five-part series]( on sanctions from FP’s Colum Lynch. The series is focused on punitive measures imposed by the United Nations but highlights the many challenges inherent in executing sanctions more generally. Thanks again for your question, which we’ll keep at top of mind as we continue to report on this story. I have a feeling this won’t be the last we hear about sanctions in this crisis. --------------------------------------------------------------- RobertHunter: Will you folks look at the crisis in terms of 1) the history of how we got here and not just current events? 2) what went wrong regarding the role of Russia? and 3) what are the requirements for building post-Cold War “architecture” in Europe that can promote stability as well as security for all? FP reporter Amy Mackinnon: That’s a great question: The historical context is really important to understanding how we got to this point. I [published a piece]( earlier in January that looked at the question of why Putin appears to see this as an opportune moment to try and renegotiate on European security and NATO expansion. I’m also working on a longer version of this that looks at all the factors that would affect Putin’s calculus on invasion, so do keep an eye out for that early next week. On the question of what went wrong, we published a piece in June 2021 that looked at how and why the [U.S.-Russia relationship has soured]( and some of the major events that contributed to that. On your third question, that’s the million-dollar question that diplomats in Europe and the United States have been trying to figure out these past few weeks and months. My sense speaking to officials here in Washington is that they think a conversation about strategic stability, arms control, and issues of transparency around military exercises would be in the interest of all involved, and they were willing to discuss that with Moscow. Russia has, however, pushed very hard on the NATO basket of issues—no expansion east and withdrawal of troops and equipment from Eastern European states—which Western officials have said is a nonstarter. There are also some questions about whether Moscow is genuine about this diplomacy or whether Russia is using it as a cover for an eventual invasion to claim that it tried diplomacy and it didn’t work. --------------------------------------------------------------- We aim to provide a space for real conversation and debate on our site without the noise you’d find on an open platform. As a reminder, FP subscribers have the [exclusive ability]( to comment on articles. New here? Setting up your profile is easy to do on FP articles; select a username to join hundreds of curious, globally-minded readers in conversation. --------------------------------------------------------------- Interested in learning more about FP Analytics’ cutting-edge research services or partnering on a FP Virtual Dialogue to engage our global audience? Contact Andrew Sollinger at andrew.sollinger@foreignpolicy.com. FOLLOW FP ON This email was sent to {EMAIL} because you are subscribed to FP communications. 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