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✖️ It could lead to the biggest transformation of the US financial system since 1971. Christianity in the Berlin lectures[edit] Main article: Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion Hegel's Encyclopedia includes a section on the Revealed Religion, but it is quite short. It is in his Berlin Lectures that we get his next presentation of Christianity, which he variously refers to as the "consummate," "absolute," or "revelatory" religion (all equivalent terms in this context).[228] Transcripts of three of Hegel's four courses have been preserved, and they show him to be continually adjusting his emphases and exposition.[ah] The interpretation of Christianity that he advances, however, is still very much that which he presented in the Phenomenology – only now he is able to expound at greater length and with greater clarity upon what he had covered earlier in such a condensed fashion.[229][230][ai] Issues of interpretation[edit] Martin Luther (1483–1546), who would not likely have recognized Hegel's claim to share his religion Walter Jaeschke questions whether Luther would have recognized Hegel's claim to Protestantism.[231] Hegel embraces the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers with his concept of spirit, but rejects the core Lutheran doctrines of sola gratia and sola scriptura. Instead, he affirms as the "fundamental principle" of Protestantism "the obstinacy that does honor to mankind, to refuse to recognize in conviction anything not ratified by thought."[232] On similar grounds, Frederick Beiser, while acknowledging Hegel's apparently sincere profession of Lutheranism, describes Hegel's theology as effectively "the very opposite of Luther's."[233] Discussing the "Hegel Renaissance" in late 20th-century Anglo-American philosophy, Beiser expresses surprise – given today's highly secular academic culture – at such a surge of interest in Hegel. For, according to Hegel, the divine is the centerpoint of philosophy. Hegel's concept of God differs from theistic conceptions found in orthodox Christianity and from deistic conceptions suggested by eighteenth-century philosophers. Nonetheless, Hegel conceptualizes God as the infinite or absolute, in agreement with the classical definition given by St. Anselm as "that of which nothing greater can be conceived."[234] Just how to most properly characterize Hegel's distinctive articulation of Christianity was a matter of intense debate even in his own life and, among his students, after his death.[235] So it is likely to remain. Neither theistic, nor deistic, Hegel's god can only be articulated in the philosophical terms of the concept of spirit or his own distinctive logical vocabulary. Nevertheless, Hegel everywhere insists that his is the Christian God.[236] History, political and philosophical[edit] "History," Frederick Beiser writes, "is central to Hegel's conception of philosophy." Philosophy is only possible "if it is historical, only if the philosopher is aware of the origins, context, and development of his doctrines." In this 1993 essay, titled "Hegel's Historicism," Beiser declares this to be "nothing less than a revolution in the history of philosophy."[237] In a 2011 monograph, however, Beiser excludes Hegel from his treatment of the German historicist tradition for the reason that Hegel is more interested in the philosophy of history than in the epistemological project of justifying its status as a science.[238] Moreover, against the relativistic implications of historicism narrowly construed, Hegel's metaphysics of spirit supplies a telos, internal to history itself, in terms of which progress can be measured and assessed. This is the self-consciousness of freedom. The more that awareness of this essential freedom of spirit permeates a culture, the more advanced Hegel claims it to be.[239] Because freedom, according to Hegel, is the essence of spirit, the developing self-awareness of this is just as much a development in truth as it is in political life.[240] Thinking presupposes an "instinctive belief" in truth, and the history of philosophy, as recounted by Hegel, is a progressive sequence of "system-identifying" concepts of truth.[241] Whether or not Hegel is a historicist simply depends upon how one defines the term. The importance of history in Hegel's philosophy, however, cannot be denied. German has two words for "history," Historie and Geschichte. The first refers to "the narrative organization of empirical material." The second "includes an account of the underlying developmental logic (the 'intrinsic ground') of deeds and events." Only the latter procedure can supply a properly universal or philosophical history, and this is the procedure Hegel adopts in all of his historical writings.[242] According to Hegel, humans are distinctly historical creatures because, not only do we exist in time, we internalize temporal events so that they become, in a profound sense, part of what and who we are, "integral to humanity's self-understanding and self-knowledge."[243] This is why the history of philosophy, for instance, is integral to philosophy itself, it being literally impossible for early philosophers to think what later philosophers, afforded all the riches of their predecessors, could think – and perhaps, with this distance, work through more thoroughly or consistently.[244] From a later perspective, for instance, it becomes apparent that the concept of personhood includes the implication of universality such as renders contradictory any interpretation or implementation that extends it to some people, but not to others.[245] In the Introduction to his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, simplifying his own account, Hegel divides human history into three epochs. In what he calls the "Oriental" world, one person (the pharaoh or emperor) was free. In the Greco-Roman world, some people (moneyed citizens) were free. In the "Germanic" world (that is, European Christendom) all persons are free.[246][247] In his discussion of the ancient world, Hegel provides a heavily qualified defense of slavery. As he puts it elsewhere, "slavery occurs in a transitional phase between the natural human existence and the truly ethical condition; it occurs in a world where a wrong is still right. Here, the wrong is valid, so that the position it occupies is a necessary one."[248] Hegel is clear, however, that there is an unconditional moral demand to reject the institution of slavery, and that slavery is incompatible with the rational state and the essential freedom of every individual.[249][250] Some commentators – most notably, Alexandre Kojève and Francis Fukuyama – have understood Hegel to claim that, having achieved a fully universal concept of freedom, history is complete, that it has reached its conclusion. Against this, however, it can be objected that freedom may yet be expanded in terms both of its scope and its content. We have, since Hegel's day, expanded the scope of our concept freedom to acknowledge the rightful inclusion of women, formerly enslaved or colonized peoples, the mentally ill, and those who do not conform to conservative norms with respect to sexual preference or gender identity, among others. As to the content of freedom, the United Nations' International Bill of Human Rights, just for instance, expands the concept of freedom beyond what Hegel himself articulates.[251] Additionally, although Hegel consistently presents his philosophical histories as East-to-West narratives, scholars such as J. M. Fritzman argue that, not only is this prejudice quite incidental to the substance of Hegel's philosophical position, but that – with India now the world's largest democracy, for instance, or with South Africa's mighty efforts to transcend apartheid – we may already be witnessing the movement of freedom back to the East.[252] Dialectics, speculation, idealism[edit] See also: Aufheben Hegel is often credited with proceeding according to a "dialectical method"; in point of fact, however, Hegel characterizes his philosophy as "speculative" (spekulativ), rather than dialectical, and uses the term "dialectical" only "quite rarely."[253][aj] This is because, although "Dialektik sometimes stands for the entire movement of the self-articulation of meaning or thought, this term refers more specifically to the self-negation of the determinations of the understanding (Verstand), when they are thought through in their fixedness and opposition."[255] By contrast, "Hegel describes correct thinking as the methodical interplay of three moments[:] (a) abstract and intellectual (verständig), (b) dialectical or negatively rational (negativvernünftig), and (c) speculative or positively rational (positivvernünfig)."[256][257][258][ak][al] For example, self-consciousness is "the concept that consciousness has of itself. Thus in this case concept and referent coincide:... 'self-consciousness' refers to mind's taking on the self-contradictory (and thus also self-negating) role of being subject and object of one and the same act of cognition – simultaneously and in the same respect."[262][263] Hence it is a speculative concept. According to Beiser, "if Hegel has any methodology at all, it appears to be an anti-methodology, a method to suspend all methods." Hegel's term "dialectic" must be understood with reference to the concept of the object of investigation. What must be grasped is "the 'self-organization' of the subject matter, its 'inner necessity' and 'inherent movement.'" Hegel renounces all external methods such as could be "applied" to some subject matter.[107] The dialectical character of Hegel's speculative procedure often makes his position on any given issue quite difficult to characterize. Instead of seeking to answer a question or solve a problem directly, he frequently recasts it by showing, for instance, "how the dichotomy underlying the dispute is false, and that it is therefore possible to integrate elements from both positions."[264] Speculative thought preserves what is true from apparently opposing theories in a process that Hegel terms "sublation." To "sublate" (aufheben) has three main senses:[am] 'to raise, to hold, life up'; 'to annul, abolish, destroy, cancel, suspend'; and, 'to keep, save, preserve.'[267] Hegel generally uses the term in all three senses, with particular emphasis on the second and third, in which apparent contradictions are speculatively overcome.[267] His word for what is sublated is "moment" (das Moment, in the neuter), which denotes "an essential feature or aspect of a whole conceived as a static system, and an essential phase in a whole conceived as a dialectical movement or process."[268] (When Hegel describes something as "contradictory," what he means is that it is not independently self-sustaining on its own terms, and so it can only be comprehended [begreifen] as a moment of a larger whole.[269]) According to Hegel, to think the finite as a moment of the whole, rather than an independently self-determined existent, is what it means to grasp it as idealized (das Ideelle).[270][271] Idealism, then, "is the doctrine that finite entities are ideal (ideell): they depend not on themselves for their existence but on some larger self-sustaining entity [i.e., the whole] that underlies or embraces them."[272] The pronoun-expressions – moment, sublate, and idealize – are characteristic of Hegel's account of idealism. They can be understood as stages of thought in which the "object is conceptually present first in mere adumbration, then according to circumstances both internal and external to it, and finally standing completely on its own."[273] This phenomenological and conceptual analysis distinguishes Hegel's idealism from Kant's transcendental idealism and Berkeley's mentalistic idealism.[274] In contrast to those positions, Hegel's idealism is entirely compatible with realism and non-mechanistic naturalism.[275] This position rejects empiricism as an a priori account of knowledge, but it is in no way opposed to the philosophical legitimacy of empirical knowledge.[276] Hegel's idealistic contention, which he claims to demonstrate, is that being itself is rational.[277] Although it is not incorrect to refer to Hegel's philosophy as "absolute idealism," this moniker was at the time more associated with Schelling, and Hegel himself is documented as employing it with reference to his own philosophy only three times.[278] According to Hegel, "every philosophy is essentially idealism."[279] This claim is based on the assumption, which Hegel claims to demonstrate, that conceptualization is present at all cognitive levels. For to completely deny this would undermine trust in the conceptual capacities necessary for objective knowledge – and so would lead to total skepticism.[280] Hence, according to Robert Stern, Hegel's idealism, "amounts to a form of conceptual realism, understood as 'the belief that concepts are part of the structure of reality.'"[281] Criticism and legacy[edit] Hegel's influence on subsequent philosophical developments has been enormous. In late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century England, a school known as British idealism propounded a version of absolute idealism in direct engagement with Hegel's texts. Prominent members included J. M. E. McTaggart, R. G. Collingwood, and G. R. G. Mure. Separately, some philosophers such as Marx, Dewey, Derrida, Adorno, and Gadamer have selectively developed Hegelian ideas into their own philosophical programs. Others have developed their positions in opposition to Hegel's system. These include, for instance, such diverse philosophers as Kierkegaard, Russell, G. E. Moore, and Foucault. In theology, Hegel's influence marks the work of Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. These names, however, constitute only a small sample of some of the more important figures who have developed their thought in engagement with the philosophy of Hegel.[282][283][284] "Right" vs. "Left" Hegelianism[edit] Some historians present Hegel's influence as divided into two opposing camps, right and left.[285] The Right Hegelians, the allegedly direct disciples of Hegel at the Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, advocated a Protestant orthodoxy and the political conservatism of the post-Napoleon Restoration period. The Left Hegelians, also known as the Young Hegelians, interpreted Hegel in a revolutionary sense, leading to an advocation of atheism in religion and liberal democracy in politics. Recent studies, however, have questioned this paradigm.[286] The Right Hegelians "were quickly forgotten" and "today mainly known only to specialists"; the Left Hegelians, by contrast, "included some of the most important thinkers of the period," and "through their emphasis on practice, some of these thinkers have remained exceedingly influential," primarily through the Marxist tradition.[287] Marxism[edit] See also: Marxist philosophy § Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel Karl Marx (1818–1883) Among the first to take a critical view of Hegel's system was the 19th-century German group known as the Young Hegelians, which included Feuerbach, Marx, Engels, and their followers. The primary thrust of their criticism is concisely expressed in the eleventh of Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach" from his 1845 German Ideology: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."[288][an] Marx also modified Hegel's teleological account of history into a materialist account of history ending in communism.[11][full citation needed] Although the influence of Hegel is sometimes depicted as mostly limited to the youthful Marx of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, the evidence of Hegel's influence on the structure of Capital is clearly displayed in draft notebooks from 1857 to 1858 published as the Grundrisse.[290][ao] In the twentieth century, this interpretation was further developed in the work of critical theorists of the Frankfurt School.[292] This was due to (a) the rediscovery and re-evaluation of Hegel as a possible philosophical progenitor of Marxism by philosophically oriented Marxists; (b) a resurgence of Hegel's historical perspective; and (c) an increasing recognition of the importance of his dialectical method. György Lukács' History and Class Consciousness (1923), in particular, helped to reintroduce Hegel into the Marxist canon.[293] Reception in France[edit] It has become commonplace to identify "French Hegel" with the lectures of Alexandre Kojève, who emphasized the master-servant [Herrschaft und Knechtschaft] dialectic (which he mistranslated as master-slave [maître et l'esclave]) and Hegel's philosophy of history. This perspective, however, overlooks over sixty years of French writing on Hegel, according to which Hegelianism was identified with the "system" presented in the Encyclopedia.[294] The later reading, drawing instead upon the Phenomenology of Spirit, was in many ways a reaction against the earlier. After 1945, "this 'dramatic' Hegelianism, which centered on the theme of historical becoming through conflict, [came] to be seen as compatible with existentialism and Marxism."[295] By confining the dialectic to history, the dominant French readings of Jean Wahl, Alexandre Kojève, and Jean Hyppolite effectively presented Hegel as providing "a philosophical anthropology instead of a general metaphysics."[296] This reading took the topic of desire as its focal point of intervention.[297] A major theme was that "a reason that seeks to be all-inclusive falsifies reality by suppressing or repressing its 'other.'"[298] Although it cannot be attributed entirely to Kojève, this reading of Hegel shaped the thought and interpretations of thinkers such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Claude Levi-Strauss, Jacques Lacan, and Georges Bataille.[299] Kojève's interpretation of the "master-slave dialectic" as the basic model of historical development also influenced the feminism of Simone de Beauvoir and the anti-racist and anti-colonial work of Frantz Fanon.[300] Racism[edit] Between the late 20th and early 21st centuries, postcolonial critique revisited many of Hegel's statements on slavery and the origins of the human spirit, noting how he supported several overtly racist theories in line with those of various other philosophers of the time, which for a long time had not been subjected to any particular analysis.[301] Nevertheless, Hegel showed great sympathy for the slave uprisings of the Haitian Revolution, in which he recognized the master-servant dialectic.[302] Haiti was the first ex-slave state to introduce universal human rights, before France or the United States. This, for Hegel, was an advance in the actualization of freedom in world history.[303][304] The President of the International Hegel Association, Dina Emundts, stated in 2020: "Being a racist and at the same time demanding human rights for all people is not a contradiction in terms. Both Kant and Hegel did that."[305] Scholar Nick Nesbitt clarifies that Hegel's philosophy of history contains a counterpoint to the classic accusation of Eurocentrism, which makes it possible to think of a different Enlightenment, which would have as its starting point the idea of universal world history, that is, history as progress in the consciousness of freedom.[304] Scholar D. Moellendorf underlines a difference between the racist positions supported by Hegel and his philosophical system. He states that Hegel's theories on the "philosophy of subjective spirit" do not necessarily lead to racism, but rather leave that possibility open. Hegel's racism, in his analysis, is explained not so much on a philosophical level as with the general climate of racism prevalent in the 19th century.[306] Allegations of authoritarianism[edit] Karl Popper makes the claim in the second volume of The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) that Hegel's system formed a thinly veiled justification for the absolute rule of Frederick William III and that Hegel's idea of the ultimate goal of history was to reach a state approximating that of 1830's Prussia.[307] Popper further proposed that Hegel's philosophy served as an inspiration for communist and fascist totalitarian governments of the 20th century, whose dialectics allow for any belief to be construed as rational simply if it could be said to exist. Kaufmann and Shlomo Avineri have criticized Popper's theories about Hegel.[308] According to Benedetto Croce, Giovanni Gentile, noted Italian Fascist, "holds the honor of having been the most rigorous neo-Hegelian in the entire history of Western philosophy and the dishonor of having been the official philosopher of Fascism in Italy."[309] Isaiah Berlin listed Hegel as one of the six architects of modern authoritarianism who undermined liberal democracy, along with Rousseau, Claude Adrien Helvétius, Fichte, Henri de Saint-Simon, and Joseph de Maistre.[310] Thesis–antithesis–synthesis[edit] Further information: Hegelian dialectic This terminology, largely developed earlier by Fichte, was spread by Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus in accounts of Hegel's philosophy that have since been broadly discredited.[311][312][313] Walter Kaufmann, for instance, reports: Fichte introduced into German philosophy the three-step of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, using these three terms. Schelling took up this terminology. Hegel did not. He never once used these three terms together to designate three stages in an argument or account in any of his books. And they do not help us understand his Phenomenology, his Logic, or his philosophy of history; they impede any open-minded comprehension of what he does by forcing it into a scheme which was available to him and which he deliberately spurned.[314] Beiser's stance is even stronger. He denies that it corresponds to any procedure in Fichte or Schelling, much less Hegel.[315] More modestly, it has been said that this account is "only a partial comprehension that requires correction." What it gets right is that, according to Hegel, "truth emerges from error" in the course of historical development in a way that implies a "holism in which partial truths are progressively corrected so that their one-sidedness is overcome." What it distorts is that such a description is possible only after the process has unfolded. The "thesis" and "antithesis" are not "alien" to one another. Inasmuch as there can be said to be such a "dialectical method," it is not an external one such as could be "applied" to some subject matter.[316] Similarly, Stephen Houlgate argues that, in whatever limited sense Hegel might be said to have a "method," it is a strictly immanent method; that is, it emerges from thoughtful immersion in the subject-matter itself. If this leads to dialectics, that is only because there is a contradiction in the object itself, not because of any external methodological procedure.[317] American pragmatism[edit] Richard J. Bernstein (1932–2022), known for his work on Hegel and American Pragmatism As documented by Richard J. Bernstein, the influence of Hegel on American Pragmatism can be divided into three moments: the late nineteenth century, the mid-twentieth, and the present.[318] The first is to be found in early issues of The Journal of Speculative Philosophy (founded 1867).[318] The second is evident in the acknowledged influence upon major figures including John Dewey, Charles Peirce, and William James.[319] As Dewey himself describes the attraction, "There were, however, also 'subjective' reasons for the appeal that Hegel's thought made to me; it supplied a demand for unification that was doubtless an intense emotional craving, and yet was a hunger that only an intellectualized subject-matter could satisfy."[320] Dewey accepted much of Hegel's account of history and society, but rejected his (probably incorrect) conception of Hegel's account of absolute knowing.[321] Two philosophers, John McDowell and Robert Brandom (sometimes referred to as the "Pittsburgh Hegelians"), constitute, per Bernstein, the third moment of Hegel's influence on pragmatism.[322] However, while openly acknowledging the influence, neither claims to explicate Hegel's views according to his own self-understanding.[ap] In addition, each is avowedly influenced by Wilfrid Sellars.[324] McDowell is particularly interested in dispelling the "myth of the given," the dichotomy between concept and intuition, whereas Brandom is concerned mostly to develop Hegel's social account of reason-giving and normative implication.[325] These appropriations of Hegel's thought are two among several "non-metaphysical" readings.[326] Non-metaphysical interpretations[edit] Bust of G. W. F. Hegel by Gustav Bläser (1872) at Hegelplatz (Dorotheenstraße) in Berlin-Mitte, Berlin Writing in 2005 for an Anglophone audience, Frederick Beiser states that the status of Hegel's metaphysics is "probably the most disputed question in Hegel scholarship."[327] Some scholars favor a religious interpretation of Hegel's metaphysics as an attempt to justify Christian beliefs through reason.[327] Other scholars have advanced a non-metaphysical approach to Hegel that interprets his philosophy as "a theory of categories, a neo-Kantian epistemology, hermeneutics, or even as anti-Christian humanism."[328] If Hegel's philosophy is metaphysics, Beiser states that these philosophers believe it is "doomed to obsolescence" as a "bankrupt enterprise" now that Kant has shown the impossibility of determining unconditioned knowledge through pure reason in his Critique.[329] Yet, since then, "perhaps the most significant recent nonmetaphysical" interpreter,[330] Robert B. Pippin, has recanted his earlier position, most notably in Pippin 2019. Even before this, introducing a collection of essays from the 2014 conference of the Hegel Society of America, Allegra de Laurentiis reports that everyone presenting on the topic of "Hegel Without Metaphysics?" affirmed the metaphysical dimension of Hegel's thought.[331] What remains in dispute, however, is how to properly characterize Hegel's (avowedly post-Kantian) metaphysical commitments.[332] As Hegel himself remarks in passing, "humans are thinking beings, and born metaphysicians. All that matters here is whether the metaphysics that is employed is of the right kind [Cross Market Review]( [Break the barriers, analyze the connections] At Cross Market Review, we are serious about being your “eyes and ears” for special opportunities for you to take advantage of. The message below from one of our partners is one we think you should take a close look at. [--------------][--------------] Неllо Friеnd! 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[Privacy Policy]( | [Terms & Conditions]( Email sent by Finance and Investing Traffic, LLC, owner and operator of Cross Market Review For the case of security questions, please contact us at [abuse@crossmarketreview.com](mailto:mailto:abuse@crossmarketreview.com). [Whitelisting us]( is the simplest way to keep up with the latest news and trends in the world of investing. [Chat] Support If you have any questions or concerns, our support team is always available to assist you. Please don’t hesitate [to reach out to us](mailto:support@crossmarketreview.com) whenever you need help. [Unsub] Unsubscribe Please don’t hesitate to reach out to us whenever you need help. [Unsubscribe]( [--------------][--------------] Copyright © 2023 Cross Market Review. All Rights Reserved. 221 W 9th St # Wilmington, DE 19801 The Philosophy of Nature[edit] See also: Naturphilosophie The philosophy of nature organizes the contingent material of the natural sciences systematically. As part of the philosophy of the real, in no way does it presume to "tell nature what it must be like."[149][150] Historically, various interpreters have questioned Hegel's understanding of the natural sciences of his time. However, this claim has been largely refuted by recent scholarship.[151] One of the very few ways in which the philosophy of nature might correct claims made by the natural sciences themselves is to combat reductive explanations; that is to discredit accounts employing categories not adequate to the complexity of the phenomena they purport to explain, as for instance, attempting to explain life in strictly chemical terms.[152] Although Hegel and other Naturphilosophen aim to revive a teleological understanding of nature, they argue that their strictly internal or immanent concept of teleology is "limited to the ends observable within nature itself." Hence, they claim, it does not violate the Kantian critique.[153] Even more strongly, Hegel and Schelling claim that Kant's restriction of teleology to regulative status effectively undermines his own critical project of explaining the possibility of knowledge. Their argument is that "only under the assumption that there is an organism is it possible to explain the actual interaction between the subjective and the objective, the ideal and the real." Hence the organism must be acknowledged to have constitutive status.[154] Introducing Hegel's philosophy of nature for a 21st-century audience, Dieter Wandschneider [de] observes that "contemporary philosophy of science" has lost sight of "the ontological issue at stake, namely, the question of an intrinsically lawful nature": "Consider, for example, the problem of what constitutes a law of nature. This problem is central to our understanding of nature. Yet philosophy of science has not provided a definitive response to it up to now. Nor can we expect to have such an answer from that quarter in future."[155] It is back to Hegel that Wandschneider would direct philosophers of science for guidance in the philosophy of nature.[156] Recent scholars have also argued that Hegel's approach to the philosophy of nature provides valuable resources for theorizing and confronting recent environmental challenges entirely unforeseen by Hegel. These philosophers point to such aspects of his philosophy as its distinctive metaphysical grounding and the continuity of its conception of the nature-spirit relationship.[157][158] The Philosophy of Spirit[edit] Priestess of Delphi (1891) by John Collier. The Delphic imperative to "know thyself" governs Hegel's entire philosophy of spirit. The German Geist has a wide range of meanings.[159] In its most general Hegelian sense, however, "Geist denotes the human mind and its products, in contrast to nature and also the logical idea."[160] (Some older translations render it as "mind," rather than "spirit."[r]) As is especially evident in the Anthropology, Hegel's concept of spirit is an appropriation and transformation of the self-referential Aristotelian concept of energeia.[162] Spirit is not something above or otherwise external to nature. It is "the highest organization and development" of nature's powers.[163] According to Hegel, "the essence of spirit is freedom."[164] The Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit charts the progressively determinate stages of this freedom until spirit fulfills the Delphic imperative with which Hegel begins: "Know thyself."[165] As becomes clear, Hegel's concept of freedom is not (or not merely) the capacity for arbitrary choice, but has as its "core notion" that "something, especially a person, is free if and only if, it is independent and self-determining, not determined by or dependent upon something other than itself."[166] It is, in other words, (at least predominantly, dialectically) an account of what Isaiah Berlin would later term positive liberty.[167] Subjective spirit[edit] Standing at the transition from nature to spirit, the role of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit is to analyze "the elements necessary for or presupposed by such relations [of objective spirit], namely, the structures characteristic of and necessary to the individual rational agent." It does this by elaborating "the fundamental nature of the biological/spiritual human individual along with the cognitive and the practical prerequisites of human social interaction."[168] This section, particularly its first part, contains various comments that were commonplace in Hegel's day and we now recognize as openly racist, such as unfounded claims about the "naturally" lower intellectual and emotional development of Black people. In his perspective, these racial differences are related to climate: according to Hegel, it is not racial characteristics, but the climactic conditions in which a people lives that variously limit or enable its capacity for free self-determination. He believes that race is not destiny: any group could, in principle, improve and transform its condition by migrating to friendlier climes.[169][s] Hegel divides his philosophy of the subjective spirit into three parts: anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology. Anthropology "deals with 'soul', which is spirit still mired in nature: all that within us which precedes our self-conscious mind or intellect." In the section "Phenomenology", Hegel examines the relation between consciousness and its object and the emergence of intersubjective rationality. Psychology "deals with a great deal that would be categorized as epistemology (or 'theory of knowledge') today. Hegel discusses, among other things, the nature of attention, memory, imagination and judgement."[170] Throughout this section, but especially in the Anthropology, Hegel appropriates and develops Aristotle's hylomorphic approach to what is today theorized as the mind–body problem: "The solution to the mind–body problem [according to this theory] hinges upon recognizing that mind does not act upon the body as cause of effects but rather acts upon itself as an embodied living subjectivity. As such, mind develops itself, progressively attaining more and more of a self-determined character."[171][172] Its final section, Free Spirit, develops the concept of "free will," which is foundational for Hegel's philosophy of right.[173][174] Objective spirit[edit] Main article: Elements of the Philosophy of Right See also: Lectures on the Philosophy of History King Frederick William III of Prussia (1797—1840) stifled the political reforms for which Hegel had hoped and advocated.[175] In the broadest terms, Hegel's philosophy of objective spirit "is his social philosophy, his philosophy of how the human spirit objectifies itself in its social and historical activities and productions."[176] Or, put differently, it is an account of the institutionalization of freedom.[177] Besier declares this a rare instance of unanimity in Hegel scholarship: "all scholars agree there is no more important concept in Hegel's political theory than freedom." This is because it is the foundation of right, the essence of spirit, and the telos of history.[178] This part of Hegel's philosophy is presented first in his 1817 Encyclopedia (revised 1827 and 1830) and then at greater length in the 1821 Elements of the Philosophy of Right, or Natural Law and Political Science in Outline (like the Encyclopedia, intended as a textbook), upon which he also frequently lectured. Its final part, the philosophy of world history, was additionally elaborated in Hegel's lectures on the subject.[179][180] Hegel's Elements of the Philosophy of Right has been controversial from the date of its original publication.[181][182] It is not, however, a straightforward defense of the autocratic Prussian state, as some have alleged, but is rather a defense of "Prussia as it was to have become under [proposed] reform administrations."[183] The German Recht in Hegel's title does not have a direct English equivalent (though it does correspond to the Latin ius and the French droit). As a first approximation, Michael Inwood distinguishes three senses: a right, claim or title justice (as in, e.g., 'to administer justice'...but not justice as a virtue...) 'the law' as a principle, or 'the laws' collectively.[184] Beiser observes that Hegel's theory is "his attempt to rehabilitate the natural law tradition while taking into account the criticisms of the historical school." He adds that "without a sound interpretation of Hegel's theory of natural law, we have very little understanding of the very foundation of his social and political thought."[185][t] Consistent with Beiser's position, Adriaan T. Peperzak documents Hegel's arguments against social contract theory and stresses the metaphysical foundations of Hegel's philosophy of right.[189][u] Observing that "analyzing the structure of Hegel's argument in the Philosophy of Right shows that achieving political autonomy is fundamental to Hegel's analysis of the state and government," Kenneth R. Westphal provides this brief outline: "'Abstract Right,' treats principles governing property, its transfer, and wrongs against property." "'Morality,' treats the rights of moral subjects, responsibility for one's actions, and a priori theories of right." "'Ethical Life' (Sittlichkeit), analyzes the principles and institutions governing central aspects of rational social life, including the family, civil society, and the state as a whole, including the government."[191] Hegel describes the state of his time, a constitutional monarchy, as rationally embodying three cooperative and mutually inclusive elements. These elements are "democracy (rule of the many, who are involved in legislation), aristocracy (rule of the few, who apply, concretize, and execute the laws), and monarchy (rule of the one, who heads and encompasses all power)."[192][193] It is what Aristotle called a "mixed" form of government, which is designed to include what is best of each of the three classical forms.[194] The division of powers "prevents an single power from dominating others."[195] Hegel is particularly concerned to bind the monarch to the constitution, limiting his authority so that he can do little more than to declare of what his ministers have already decided that it is to be so.[196] The relation of Hegel's philosophy of right to modern liberalism is complex. He sees liberalism as a valuable and characteristic expression of the modern world. However, it carries the danger within itself to undermine its own values. This self-destructive tendency may be avoided by measuring "the subjective goals of individuals by a larger objective and collective good." Moral values, then, have only a "limited place in the total scheme of things."[197] Yet, although it is not without reason that Hegel is widely regarded as a major proponent of what Isaiah Berlin would later term positive liberty, he was just as "unwavering and unequivocal" in his defense of negative liberty.[198] If Hegel's ideal sovereign is much weaker than was typical in monarchies his time, so too is his democratic element much weaker than is typical in democracies of our time. Although he insists upon the importance of public participation, Hegel severely limits suffrage and follows the English bicameral model, in which only members of the lower house, that of commoners and bourgeoisie, are elected officials. Nobles in the upper house, like the monarch, inherit their positions.[199] The final part of the Philosophy of Objective Spirit is entitled "World History." In this section, Hegel argues that "this immanent principle [the Stoic logos] produces with logical inevitability an expansion of the species' capacities for self determination ('freedom') and a deepening of its self understanding ('self-knowing')."[200] In Hegel's own words: "World history is progress in the consciousness of freedom – a progress that we must comprehend conceptually."[201] (See also: Legacy, below, for further discussion of the complex legacy of Hegel's social and political philosophy.) Absolute spirit[edit] See also: Absolute (philosophy) Hegel with his Berlin students (1828 sketch by F. T. Kugler) Hegel's use of the term "absolute" is easily misunderstood. Inwood, however, clarifies: derived from the Latin absolutus, it means "not dependent on, conditional on, relative to or restricted by anything else; self-contained, perfect, complete."[202] For Hegel, this means that absolute knowing can only denote "an 'absolute relation' in which the ground of experience and the experiencing agent are one and the same: the object known is explicitly the subject who knows."[203] That is, the only "thing" (which is really an activity) that is truly absolute is that which is entirely self-conditioned, and according to Hegel, this only occurs when spirit takes itself up as its own object. The final section of his Philosophy of Spirit presents the three modes of such absolute knowing: art, religion, and philosophy.[v] It is with reference to different modalities of consciousness – intuition, representation, and comprehending thinking – that Hegel distinguishes the three modes of absolute knowing.[w] Frederick Beiser summarizes: "art, religion and philosophy all have the same object, the absolute or truth itself; but they consist in different forms of knowledge of it. Art presents the absolute in the form of immediate intuition (Anschauung); religion presents it in the form of representation (Vorstellung); and philosophy presents it in the form of concepts (Begriffe)."[205] Rüdiger Bubner additionally clarifies that the increase in conceptual transparency according to which these spheres are systematically ordered is not hierarchical in any evaluative sense.[206] Although Hegel's discussion of absolute spirit in the Encyclopedia is quite brief, he develops his account at length in lectures on the philosophy of fine art, the philosophy of religion, and the history of philosophy.[180] Philosophy of art[edit] Main article: Lectures on Aesthetics The ancient Athenian, according to Hegel, apprehends the meaning of Athena Parthenos directly as his own rational essence.[207] (The Varvakeion Athena, National Archaeological Museum of Athens) In the Phenomenology, and even in the 1817 edition of the Encyclopedia, Hegel discusses art only as it figures in what he terms the "Art-Religion" of the ancient Greeks. In 1818, however, Hegel begins lecturing on the philosophy of art as an explicitly autonomous domain.[206][208][x] Although H. G. Hotho titled his edition of the Lectures Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik [Lectures on Aesthetics], Hegel directly states that his topic is not "the spacious realm of the beautiful," but "art, or, rather, fine art."[209] He doubles down on this in the next paragraph by explicitly distinguishing his project from the broader philosophical projects pursued under the heading of "aesthetics" by Christian Wolff and Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten.[y] Some critics – most canonically, Benedetto Croce, in 1907[210] – have attributed to Hegel some form of the thesis that art is "dead." Hegel, however, never said any such thing, nor can such a view be plausibly attributed to him.[z] Indeed, one commentator places that debate in perspective with the observation that Hegel's claim that "art no longer serves our highest aims" is "radical not for the suggestion that art now fails to do so but for the suggestion that it ever did."[211] Hegel's detailed and systematic treatment of the various arts over such a great span has even led Ernst Gombrich to present Hegel as "the father of art history." Indeed, until recently, Hegel's Lectures were largely ignored by philosophers and received most of their attention from literary critics and art historians.[212] The more narrowly conceptual project of the philosophy of art, however, is to articulate and defend "the autonomy of art, making possible an account of the special individuality distinguishing works of aesthetic worth."[213] According to Hegel, "'artistic beauty reveals absolute truth through perception.'[214] He holds that the best art conveys metaphysical knowledge by revealing, through sense perception, what is unconditionally true," that is, "what his metaphysical theory affirms to be unconditional or absolute."[215] So, while Hegel "ennobles art insofar as it conveys metaphysical knowledge," "he tempers his assessment in view of his belief that art's sensory media can never adequately convey what completely transcends the contingency of sensation."[216] This is why, according to Hegel, art can only be one of three mutually complimentary modes of absolute spirit.[aa] Christianity[edit] Although his understanding of Christianity evolved over time, Hegel identified as a Lutheran his entire life. One constant was his profound appreciation for the Christian insight into the intrinsic worth and freedom of every individual.[217] Early Romantic writings[edit] Hegel's earliest writings on Christianity date between 1783 and 1800. He was still working out his ideas at this time, and everything from this period was abandoned as fragments or unfinished drafts.[218][ab] Hegel was very much dissatisfied with the dogmatism and positivity[ac] of the Christian religion, to which he opposed the spontaneous religion of the Greeks.[220] In The Spirit of Christianity, he proposes a sort of resolution by aligning the universality of Kantian moral philosophy with the universality of the teachings of Jesus; in paraphrase: "The moral principle of the Gospel is charity, or love, and love is the beauty of the heart, a spiritual beauty which combines the Greek Soul and Kant's Moral Reason."[221] Although he did not return to this Romantic formulation, the unification of Greek and Christian thought would remain a preoccupation throughout his life.[222] Christianity in The Phenomenology of Spirit[edit] Religion is a major theme throughout the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit well before it emerges as the explicit topic of the penultimate Religion chapter.[ad] We see this most directly in the metaphysical "unhappiness" of the Augustinian consciousness in chapter IV and in Hegel's depiction of the struggle of the Church of the Faithful with Enlightenment philosophes in chapter VI.[ae] Hegel's proper account of Christianity, however, is to be found in the final section of the Phenomenology just prior to the closing chapter, Absolute Knowing. It is presented under the heading The Revelatory Religion [die offenbare Religion]. By means of philosophical exposition of Christian doctrines such as Incarnation and Resurrection, Hegel claims to demonstrate or to make "manifest" the conceptual truth of Christianity, and so to overcome was has only been positively revealed [geöffenbarte] by explication of its underlying, revelatory truth.[af] The heart of Hegel's interpretation of Christianity can be seen in his interpretation of the Trinity. God the Father must give Himself existence as finitely human Son, the death of whom discloses His essential being as Spirit – and, crucially, according to Hegel, his [Hegel's] own philosophical concept of spirit makes transparent what is only obscurely represented in the Christian concept of the Trinity. And so it makes manifest the philosophical truth of religion, which now is known.[224] In an essay on the Phenomenology, George di Giovanni contrasts Kant's rational faith[ag] with Hegel's rational religion. On his view, the modern role of religion consists in "expressing and nurturing spirit in its most individual forms" rather than in explaining reality. There is no longer any place for faith in opposition to knowledge. Instead, faith assumes such forms as the trust placed "in individuals close to us, or in the time and place in which we happen to live."[226] In other words, according to Hegel's philosophical interpretation, Christianity does not require faith in any doctrine that is not fully justified by reason. What is left, then, is the religious community, free to minister to individual needs and to celebrate the absolute freedom of spirit.[227] Christianity in the Berlin lectures[edit]