Political parties must respond to disruption

[BloombergOpinion]( [Early Returns]( [Jonathan Bernstein]( I’m headed to Chicago this week to attend the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, and I’m on a roundtable about the 2020 nomination; I’ve also been finishing up a chapter I’m writing about where the process stands after 2016. So I’ve had presidential nominations on my mind even more than usual. I expected, when I revisited Donald Trump’s nomination, to find that one reason Republican Party actors failed to prevent it was that they didn’t anticipate changes in the process. Stability is good for parties and for coalition-building; it allows for a shared understanding of campaign developments and ensures that party actors know how to influence the process. Changes to the system give candidates an opportunity to exploit the rules and win on their own, without the party. That’s essentially what happened in 1972 and 1976 after Democrats radically changed their nomination practices. In 2016, changes to the Republican process included the end of the Ames Straw Poll, which had been a significant decision point for struggling candidates, and evolving media norms, in which CNN and other outlets decided to heavily cover one candidate for months instead of switching between various contenders. Those changes made coordination against Trump much harder, because party actors consistently misunderstood how the contest was going. Even though almost all of them opposed Trump, they didn’t realize soon enough what was necessary to defeat him. There was more to Trump’s victory, of course, but that was a big part of it. One thing I realized while working on this project, though, was that the nomination process always changes from cycle to cycle, in big ways and small. And while parties are good at adapting in the long run, disruptive changes make it harder for them to react quickly. When that happens, parties are weakened and other factors – interest groups, the mass media, internal factions, random luck – become more influential in choosing nominees. That’s important, because it’s through nominations that parties define themselves. So what could be different for Democrats in 2020? There are some changes that don’t seem like they’ll matter much. There will be fewer caucuses this time, for instance, and the states still holding them are [making an effort]( to increase participation. At the convention, meanwhile, superdelegates won’t be able to vote on the first ballot if the nomination is contested. It’s possible that one or both of these changes will disrupt things, but as of now I don’t think it’s likely. A bit more concerning are changes that seem to favor [fringe candidates](. Cable television seems to be very interested in them, for one thing: CNN is holding an unusually inclusive series of town halls, including hour-long showcases for [businessman Andrew Yang and “spiritual book author” Marianne Williamson](. These candidates could also benefit the very loose requirements Democrats are using for their first round of debates, as well as from online fundraising from small donors. So far, this shift seems to be mainly harming middle-tier candidates with conventional credentials – such as Cory Booker, Kirsten Gillibrand, Amy Klobuchar and Jay Inslee – who haven’t broken through in a very large field. But it’s still early. And most party actors won’t be distracted by the latest no-name surge. They’ll pay more attention to policy initiatives, such as Julian Castro’s [new immigration plan](, Kamala Harris’s [education proposals](, or any number of ideas that Elizabeth Warren has set out. In fact, they could care more about reaching agreements on policy positions and priorities than about who the nominee winds up being – as long as he or she can be counted on to support the right positions. So I’m not too worried about the changes that are emerging in this cycle. But I do appreciate, better than I did before 2016, that the struggle to adapt and to control nominations is never over for parties. 1. Seth Masket at Mischiefs of Faction on the [National Popular Vote movement](. 2. I have no reason to disagree with Dan Drezner’s [scathing view of Trump’s foreign policy](. But I think it’s highly unlikely it will make any difference in the 2020 election, unless Trump stumbles into an unpopular war or harms the U.S. economy. 3. Lots of fascinating [findings on partisan polarization]( from the Wason Center. 4. David G. Victor at the Monkey Cage on [changes in energy usage worldwide](. 5. Also at the Monkey Cage, Jacob Aasland Ravndal on [measuring right-wing violence](. 6. Barbara McQuade at Just Security on what Attorney General William Barr will consider “[grand jury information](” and attempt to withhold from Congress and the public. Note that we really have no idea what Barr will do, or whether it will be legitimate, something close to a cover-up, or something in between. It’s good to be aware of the issues, but beyond that we just don’t know. 7. Greg Sargent on Trump’s [ugly tweets on Puerto Rico](. 8. And my Bloomberg Opinion colleague Francis Wilkinson [on Joe Biden](. Get Early Returns every morning in your inbox. [Click here to subscribe](hash=b9b2681361bede0e1069ca238efb1ec2). Also subscribe to [Bloomberg All Access]( and get much, much more. You’ll receive our unmatched global news coverage and two in-depth daily newsletters, the Bloomberg Open and the Bloomberg Close. Bloomberg L.P. ● 731 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 10022 [Web]( ● [Facebook]( ● [Twitter]( [Feedback]( ● [Unsubscribe](